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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the inuence of the quest for status in a Ramsey-
type model with endogenous labor supply and homogenous agents. In macroeconomics
it has been the practice of most researchers to assume that status, modeled in terms of
instantaneous preferences, depends either on relative consumption or on relative wealth.
While our model includes both specications of status, we will emphasize the implications
of the latter, relative wealth. In our work, we will employ not only a general specication
of preferences, but also a specic illustration that will allow us to conduct a very detailed
analysis of the impact of status on the transitional dynamics.
The relative consumption approach has been used by researchers such as Boskin and
Sheshinski (1978), Galí (1994), Persson (1995), Harbaugh (1996), Rauscher (1997), Gross-
mann (1998), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Fisher and Hof (2000a,b), Dupor and Liu
(2003), Abel (2005), and Liu and Turnovsky (2005). In contrast, the relative wealth ap-
proach is employed in Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001a,b), Futagami and Shibata (1998),
Hof and Wirl (2003), Fisher (2004), Van Long and Shimomura (2004a, b), and Fisher and
Hof (2005). In the majority of this research the supply of labor is exogenously given.1 This
turns out to be a restrictive assumption. In models with xed employment that abstract
from physical depreciation and technical progress, such as Rauscher (1997) and Fisher and
Hof (2000a), the steady-state values of consumption and capital are independent of con-
sumption externalities: only transitional dynamics is a¤ected. Moreover, Fisher and Hof
(2000a) have shown that in the xed employment case there exist several quite general
types of instantaneous utility functions in which the decentralized solution is e¢ cient in
spite of the existence of consumption externalities. If, on the other hand, work e¤ort is
endogenously determined, then i) not only is the dynamic behavior of the economy af-
fected by a preference for status, but also the properties of its stationary equilibrium, and
ii) the quest for status always gives rise to ine¢ cient decentralized solutions. For these
reasons we believe that it is interesting to consider the implications of status preferences
1There are a few exceptions in which labor supply is treated as endogenously determined. This re-
search di¤ers from our paper as follows: Persson (1995) considers heterogeneous agents, but neglects any
intertemporal considerations and relative wealth. Fisher and Hof (2000b) restrict attention to consump-
tion externalities. The framework in Dupor and Liu (2003) is static and ignores relative wealth. Liu and
Turnovsky (2005) consider both exogenous and endogenous labor supply, but do not analyze relative wealth
externalities.
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in the endogenous employment setting. Our extension allows us rst to consider whether
in the long run status-conscious people work too muchor too little, compared to the
social optimum and whether the answer to this question depends on the way status is
modelled. In addition, we examine the short- and medium-term deviation of the decen-
tralized solution from its socially optimal counterpart. Furthermore, we analyze whether
the ine¢ ciencies resulting from status preferences can be removed by an appropriate tax
policy.
To focus on the consequences of status preferences, we keep the rest of our economic
framework as simple as possible, e.g., we employ a standard constant returns to scale
production function and abstract from factors such as technological progress and physi-
cal depreciation. While our specication of instantaneous preferences accommodates both
relative consumption and relative wealth, our contribution, as indicated above, centers on
the short and long-run implications of the latter. Moreover, among the other goals of the
paper is the comparison of the long-run properties of economies with relative wealth pref-
erences to those in which status is a function of relative consumption. In certain respects,
the e¤ects of relative consumption and relative wealth externalities on the steady-state
equilibrium of the decentralized economy are similar, e.g., both lead (identical) agents to
consume too muchand to accumulate an excessivestock of physical capital. In other
respects, however, the two specications can have very di¤erent long-run implications. For
example, we demonstrate in our general preference specication that it is not necessarily
the case that agents supply too muchlabor in the relative wealth framework. Indeed, we
show in the rst part of the paper that it is possible that agents work too littlein this
setting, a result that stands in contrast to the ndings of recent researchers such as Fisher
and Hof (2000b) and Liu and Turnovsky (2005), who prove, under general assumptions,
that agents work too hardif social status depends on the level of average consumption.
Another distinction between the two approaches is that the ine¢ ciencies stemming from
relative wealth approach are due to the fact that the e¤ective rate of return of wealth
exceeds the market rate, while in the relative consumption framework the private equi-
librium is ine¢ cient because the willingness to substitute consumption for leisure is too
high.
Another focus of the paper is an analysis of the transitional dynamics of an econ-
omy characterized by relative wealth preferences. To do so, we adopt in the second half
2
of the paper a simple parameterization of preferences in which work e¤ort is additively
separable from consumption and relative wealth and in which the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution for consumption is constant in the symmetric equilibrium. A crucial
advantage of this illustration is that it yields a unique, saddlepoint-stable steady state,
properties that do not (necessarily) hold for the general formulation of preferences em-
ployed in the rst part of the paper. A further advantage of this particular specication
is that the socially optimal solution is obtained simply by setting the status parameter
equal to zero in the corresponding solutions of the decentralized economy. Note, however,
that the latter characteristic does not obtain generally and, in particular, does not hold
in the relative consumption model of Harbaugh (1996) that is further analyzed by Fisher
and Hof (2000a).
Using the illustration, we are able to derive the economys linearized dynamics in
state-control space, i.e., in terms of physical capital and, respectively, consumption and
employment. Specically, we employ this analytical framework to consider the e¤ects of a
higher degree of status preference on the economys transitional dynamics. We demonstrate
that in the initial phase of adjustment agents in the decentralized economy consume too
little and work too hard compared to the values that would obtain in the socially
optimal setting. We supplement the analytical results of this part of the paper with phase
diagrams that describe the co-movements of physical capital and, in turn, consumption
and work e¤ort. The phase diagrams assist us in showing how the steady states and initial
values for the control variables in the decentralized economies di¤er from their socially
optimal counterparts. Another notable nding from this part of the paper includes the
fact that for all admissible parameter values, an increase in the status parameter slows
downthe economys speed of convergence along stable saddle path.
We continue our analysis of the specic parameterization of preferences by simulat-
ing numerically the adjustment paths of consumption and work e¤ort for the linearized
dynamics. This exercise allows us to display properties of the economys intertemporal ad-
justment that are not completely revealed by the phase diagrams. Restricting attention to
the case in which the initial value of capital is below its steady-state level, we show that the
decentralized and socially optimal paths of consumption cross, in the sense that initial
under-consumption becomes medium-term and long-run over-consumption. Indeed, this is
a necessary counterpart of the fact that status-conscious agents accumulate too much
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physical capital during the transition to steady state. Regarding the transitional dynam-
ics of work e¤ort, we show that its behavior in both the decentralized and the socially
planned economy depends crucially on the di¤erence between the parameter describing
the (inverse) of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption and the share
of capital in national income. For the case corresponding to an empirically plausible, i.e.,
lowvalue of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the paths of decentralized and
socially optimal employment cross, since in this case agents work too hard initially,
but subsequently too little.Finally, we complete the analysis of the illustration by briey
treating the question of optimal taxation. Here, we prove that an optimal tax on capital
income ensures that the decentralized economy reproduces the social optimum and show
that the tax rate rises along with the physical capital stock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the basic macroeco-
nomic model and studies the social planners problem. The rst part of section 3 analyzes
the decentralized framework for the general model of preferences and studies the deviation
of its steady state from its socially optimal counterpart. The next part of section 3 uses
the specic parameterization of preferences to study the saddle path adjustment of the
solution of the linearized model. As indicated above, this includes the initial response of
consumption and work e¤ort along their respective saddle paths as well as the transitional
adjustment of these variables compared to their socially optimal counterparts. The last
part of section 3 briey discusses the issue of optimal taxation of capital income. Section 4
contains some brief concluding remarks. The paper closes with an appendix that contains
some mathematical results and proofs referred to in the main text.
2 The Model and the Social Planners Problem
2.1 Specication of the Model
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, innitely-lived individuals.
For simplicity, we assume that the population size remains constant over time. As is
usual in the Ramsey framework, we restrict attention to the case in which agents possess
perfect foresight. The representative individual chooses the time paths of own consumption
c and own work e¤ort (measured by hours worked) l in order to maximize discounted
intertemporal utility, which is given by
R1
0 e
 tu (c; l; z) dt, where  is the constant rate
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of time preference, u denotes the instantaneous utility function, and z denotes a variable
that determines the agents relative position, or status, in society. In our model status is
either determined by relative consumption, i.e., z  c=C, where C denotes the average (or
per capita) consumption in the economy, or by relative wealth, i.e., z  a=A, where a is
the agents own nonhuman wealth, while A denotes the average wealth in the economy.
As indicated above, we focus in this paper on the latter case in which the status variable
is relative wealth. These specications imply that in both approaches leisure is assumed
to be a non-positional good.2
We further assume that u possesses continuous rst-order and second-order partial
derivatives that have the following usual properties:
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul < 0; ull < 0; uz > 0; uzz < 0; uccull   u2cl > 0; (1)
ulcuc   ulucc < 0; ulluc   ulucl < 0: (2)
According to (1), the representative individual derives positive and diminishing marginal
utility from both own consumption and her relative position in society as measured by
the variable z, in addition to positive and increasing marginal disutility from working,
(i.e., positive, but diminishing, marginal utility from leisure). Moreover, the instantaneous
utility function u is jointly strictly concave in (c; l). In addition, the conditions stated in
(2) ensure that consumption and leisure are normal goods.
In this simple framework we specify that individuals own the economys physical cap-
ital, k, the services of which are rented to rms in a perfectly competitive capital market
that yields a real return of r. In addition, the representative individual supplies l units
of labor services per unit of time and receives the real wage w, which is determined in a
perfectly competitive labor market. Individuals can lend to and borrow from other indi-
viduals. Since physical capital and loans are assumed to be perfect substitutes as stores
of value, they must pay the same real return of r. The ow budget constraint of the
representative agent is then given by
_a = ra+ wl   c; (3)
where nonhuman wealth a consists of physical capital k and net loans b. We will assume
that k (0) = k0 > 0 and b (0) = b0 = 0 so that a (0) = k0, where k0 is exogenously given
2See Frank (1985) for a discussion of positional goods.
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and positive. We further assume that the credit market imposes the following No-Ponzi
Game (NPG) condition on the agents borrowing:
lim
t!1

a (t) exp

 
Z t
0
r (v) dv

 0: (4)
Since agents in our model are identical in every respect, each holds zero net loans in any
symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium, implying a = k  0.
With respect to the production sector, we assume that there is a large number of per-
fectly competitive rms that rent the services of physical capital and labor to produce
output. In addition, each rm has access to the same production possibilities. For conve-
nience, we ignore in our subsequent analysis both depreciation of capital and technological
progress. The production function is denoted by y = F (k; l), where y denotes output and
is assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal
productivity of both factors, along with constant returns to scale. To consider whether
the introduction of relative consumption or relative wealth into the instantaneous utility
function leads to Pareto nonoptimality, we will compare the decentralized solutions with
the solution from a hypothetical social planners problem. We will begin with the social
planners problem that yields identical solutions for the two alternative specications of
status preferences.
2.2 The Social Planners Problem
Suppose that there exists a benevolent social planner who dictates the choices of con-
sumption and hours worked over time and who seeks to maximize the welfare of the rep-
resentative individual. Since individuals are identical, we assume that the social planner
assigns to each the same consumption level and the same level of work e¤ort. Consequently,
c(t) = C(t), a (t) = A (t) and, thus, z (t) = 1 hold for all t. Hence, the social planners
optimization problem can be written as follows: maximize intertemporal utility, equal toR1
0 e
 tu (c; l; 1) dt, by choosing the time paths of c and l subject to the economys resource
constraint
_k = F (k; l)  c; (5)
and the initial condition k (0) = k0 > 0, where k0 is exogenously given. The current-value
Hamiltonian for this problem is given by H = u (c; l; 1)+ [F (k; l)  c], where the costate
variable  denotes the shadow price of capital. The necessary optimality conditions for an
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interior solution are given by Hc = 0, Hl = 0, and _ =  Hk:
uc (c; l; 1)   = 0; (6)
ul (c; l; 1) + Fl (k; l) = 0; (7)
_ =   [Fk (k; l)  ]: (8)
The transversality condition is given by
lim
t!1 e
 tk = 0: (9)
The concavity assumptions made above ensure that if (c; l; k) satises (5)(9) and the
initial condition k (0) = k0, then it is an optimal path. The properties of this solution with
respect to its steady state and transitional dynamics will be studied in the next section.
3 Decentralized Economy
3.1 General Solution
If preferences are of the relative wealth type, then in the decentralized economy the rep-
resentative individual chooses the time paths c and l to maximize
R1
0 e
 tu (c; l; a=A) dt,
subject to the ow budget constraint (3), the NPG-condition (4), and the initial con-
dition a (0) = k0. The representative agent takes not only the time paths of the rental
rate of capital r and the real wage rate w, but also the time path of average wealth A
as given. In order to obtain a well-behaved optimization problem in which the necessary
conditions are also su¢ cient, we will assume that the function U (c; l; a; A)  u (c; l; a=A)
is strictly concave in (c; l; a). The current-value Hamiltonian of this optimization problem
is H = u (c; l; a=A) +  (ra+ wl   c). The necessary optimality conditions for an interior
solution are given by Hc = 0, Hl = 0, and _ =  Ha:
uc (c; l; a=A)   = 0; (10)
ul (c; l; a=A) + w = 0; (11)
_ =   (r   )  uz (c; l; a=A)A 1 =  

r +
uz (c; l; a=A)A
 1
uc (c; l; a=A)
  

: (12)
The transversality condition equals
lim
t!1 e
 ta = 0: (13)
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The concavity assumptions made above ensure that if (c; l; a) satises (10)(13), (3), and
the initial condition a (0) = k0, then it is an optimal path.
In (12), the expression r+
 
uzA
 1 =uc  re gives the e¤ective return of wealth under
relative wealth preferences. It is the sum of the market rate of return r and the status-
related component
 
uzA
 1 =uc, where the latter can be explained as follows. The fraction
uz=uc gives the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of status, as measured by z = a=A,
for consumption c. The expression A 1 = za is the partial derivative of relative wealth
with respect to own wealth. Hence, the status-related component
 
uzA
 1 =uc is the MRS
of own wealth a for consumption c.
The next step in our analysis is to derive the symmetric macroeconomic equilibria for
the decentralized economy. Since all individuals are identical, this means that: i) identical
individuals make identical choices so that a = A and z  a=A = 1 for all t; ii) each
individual holds zero net loans so that net wealth is simply equal to the capital stock, i.e.,
a = k; iii) the real rental rate and the real wage are determined by the prot-maximizing
conditions r = Fk (k; l) and w = Fl (k; l); and iv) the constant returns to scale assumption
implies that F (k; l) = rk + wl. In a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium the dynamic
evolution of (c; l; k; ) is determined by the conditions for the optimal choice of c and l,
equations (6) and (7), the economys ow resource constraint (5), the di¤erential equation
_ =  

Fk (k; l) +
uz (c; l; 1) k
 1
uc (c; l; 1)
  

 (14)
that governs the dynamic evolution of the shadow price , the transversality condition (9)
and the initial condition k (0) = k. Note that these equations and conditions are identical
with those that determine the socially optimal solution, with the single exception that (8),
_ =   [Fk (k; l)  ], is replaced by (14). This means that in the relative wealth context
the equilibrium e¤ective rate of return, Fk+(uz=uc) k 1, exceeds the market rate of return,
Fk, which, in turn, implies that the decentralized solution is ine¢ cient.
As we discussed in the introduction, one of our major goals in this paper is to contrast
the implications of the relative wealth preferences with those of relative consumption.
Since the relative consumption approach has been dealt with in detail by authors such
as Fisher and Hof (2000b) and Liu and Turnovsky (2005), we will employ their main re-
sults without reproducing their analysis. In the socially planned economy the marginal
rate of substitution of consumption for leisure as perceived by the social planner, who
takes into account the externalities, is given by (MRS)p (c; l) = uc (c; l; 1) = [ ul (c; l; 1)],
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where the superscript p stands for (social) planner. Under relative wealth preferences,
in a symmetric equilibrium the MRS of consumption for leisure as perceived by the rep-
resentative consumer who takes the time path of A as given equals (MRS)d;rw (c; l) =
uc (c; l; 1) = [ ul (c; l; 1)], where the superscripts d and rw stand, respectively, for decen-
tralized (economy) and relative wealth. From (MRS)p (c; l) = (MRS)d;rw (c; l) it is
clear that wealth externalities do not (directly) distort the choice of consumption and
work e¤ort. Instead, as is evident from the costate equation (14), they distort the dy-
namic evolution of the economy by raising the decentralized rate of return of wealth,
Fk + (uz=uc) k
 1, above its socially optimal counterpart, Fk.
If preferences are of the relative consumption type, then the di¤erential equation gov-
erning the dynamic evolution of the shadow value of wealth is the same as in the socially
planned economy, _ =   [Fk (k; l)  ]. In other words, the decentralized rate of return
is not distorted in a direct way if status depends on relative consumption. Instead, con-
sumption externalities raise the willingness to substitute consumption for leisure above its
socially optimal level. More specically, in a symmetric equilibrium in which c = C, the
decentralized MRS as perceived by the representative consumer corresponds to
(MRS)d;rc (c; l) =
uc (c; l; 1) + c
 1uz (c; l; 1)
 ul (c; l; 1) > (MRS)
p (c; l) ; (15)
where the superscript rc stands for relative consumption. Observe that the expression
uc+c
 1uz > 0measures the total marginal utility of own consumption. Because agents take
the time path of C as given, they believe that an increase in c would also result in a rise in
relative consumption (and status). The term c 1uz measures the perceived additional gain
in utility. Of course, because all agents act in this way, no one agent succeeds in raising
relative consumption. In Fisher and Hof (2000b) it is shown that the distortions arising
from consumption externalities can be eliminated by imposing an appropriate consumption
tax.
Finally, under relative consumption preferences some properties of the steady state are
easily obtained by using the fact that the di¤erential equations _ =   [Fk (k; l)  ] and
_k = F (k; l)  c are common to both the decentralized and the socially planned economies.
Since, in addition, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, it is clear
that the decentralized steady-state value of the capital-labor ratio, k=l, equals its socially
optimal counterpart, determined by Fk (k=l; 1) = . Nevertheless, while the decentralized
9
ratios k=l and c=l are optimal in the long run, the decentralized levels of c, l and k are
not. Under plausible assumptions with respect to preferences, it is straightforward to show
[see, for example, Fisher and Hof (2000b) and Liu and Turnovsky (2005)] that in long-
run equilibrium agents work and consume too much, and excessively accumulate physical
capital.
Having reviewed some of the basic properties of the relative consumption model, we
continue with our analysis of the relative wealth specication. First, we will show that the
characteristics of the steady state di¤er signicantly from those resulting from the relative
consumption specication. To do so, it is convenient to rewrite the production function
in the intensive form F (k; l) = lf (), where   k=l denotes the capital-labor ratio and
f ()  F (; 1). This notation implies that Fk (k; l) = f 0 () and Fl (k; l) = f () f 0 ().
In the decentralized economy the steady-state values of consumption, work e¤ort, and the
capital-labor ratio, denoted by ~cd, ~ld, and ~d, are determined by
c = lf () ; (16)
 ul (c; l; 1)
uc (c; l; 1)
= f ()  f 0 () ; (17)
0 = f 0 () +
uz (c; l; 1)
uc (c; l; 1)
1
l
  : (18)
In the socially planned economy the corresponding steady-state values, ~cp, ~lp, and ~p, are
determined by (16), (17), while (18) is replaced by
f 0 () = : (19)
To derive relationships that enable us to compare the decentralized to the socially
optimal steady state, we rst we solve equations (16) and (17) implicitly for c and l in
terms of :
c = hc () ; hc =
(ucull   uclul) lf 0 + fu2cf 00
(ucull   uclul) + (ulcuc   uccul) f ; (20)
l = hl () ; hl =
u2cf
00   (ulcuc   uccul) lf 0
(ucull   uclul) + (ulcuc   uccul) f : (21)
Using, in turn, equation (21) and the relationship k = l, we obtain the following solution
for the capital stock k:
k = hk () ; hk =
(ucull   uclul) l + (ulcuc   uccul) l (f   f 0) + u2c2f 00
(ucull   uclul) + (ulcuc   uccul) f : (22)
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In (20)(22) l = hl () and the partial derivatives of u are evaluated at
 
hc () ; hl () ; 1

.
Taking into account that ucull uclul < 0 and ulcuc uccul < 0 hold due to the normality
conditions given in (2) and that f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0, and f   f 0 > 0, it is obvious that hc > 0
and hk > 0, while, in contrast, the sign of h
l
 cannot be determined unambiguously. Since
(16) and (17) and thus (20)(22) hold both in the socially planned economy and the
decentralized economy, we obtain
~cd = hc(~d); ~ld = hl(~d); ~kd = hk(~d); (23)
~cp = hc (~p) ; ~lp = hl (~p) ; ~kp = hk (~p) : (24)
While the functions hc, hl, and hk are identical in both economies, the corresponding
steady-state values are not. From (18) and (19) it follows that
f 0(~d) = f 0 (~p)  uz(~c
d; ~ld; 1)
uc(~cd; ~ld; 1)
1
~d~ld
< f 0 (~p) :
From f 0(~d) < f 0 (~p) and f 00 < 0, it is clear that any steady-state value ~d satises
the condition ~d > ~p, implying that the long-run capital-labor ratio is higher in the
decentralized equilibrium. Observe, however, that uniqueness of the steady state is not a
general property of the relative wealth framework [see e.g. Corneo and Jeanne (2001a),
Hof and Wirl (2003)]. From (16) and f 0 > 0, it then follows that ~cd=~ld > ~cp=~lp. Moreover,
taking into account that hc > 0 and h
k
 > 0, we obtain ~c
d > ~cp and ~kd > ~kp, i.e., individuals
consume too much and accumulate an excessive stock of capital in steady-state equilibrium.
On the other hand, since the sign of hl cannot be determined unambiguously, we cannot
infer from this analysis whether ~ld > ~lp or ~ld  ~lp holds. Below we will show by means
of an illustration that unlike the relative consumption approach, it is indeed possible that
the steady-state level of work e¤ort is less than or equal to its socially optimal counterpart
and that this steady state is sensible, since it has the desirable saddlepoint property.
In order to study the stability properties of the steady states in both the decentralized
economy and the socially planned one, we could apply the standard procedures described
in detail in Turnovsky (1995) to our general model. While the analysis of the socially
planned economy yields the result that the corresponding unique steady state exhibits the
saddlepoint property, a similar result cannot be obtained in the decentralized economy
without imposing many additional assumptions with respect to the partial derivatives uz,
uzl, and uzc. For this reason, we will subsequently restrict our attention to a simple illus-
tration. On the one hand, this particular specication yields a unique, saddlepoint-stable
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steady state. On the other hand, it is su¢ ciently general to allow for both a wide vari-
ety of transitional dynamics and the steady-state properties of work e¤ort. For example,
whether agents work too littleor too muchin the long run, depends on the value of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption.
3.2 Illustration
We assume that the instantaneous utility function takes the form
u (c; l; z) = (1  ) 1

cz
1    1  l1+; (25)
where   0,  > 0,  > 0,  > 0, and  (   1) +  > 0. These assumptions ensure that
the function U (c; l; a; A)  u (c; l; a=A) is jointly concave in (c; l; a). Moreover, we assume
that the production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas specication
F (k; l) = Bkl1 a; B > 0; 0 <  < 1: (26)
Our specications imply that the optimization problems of both the representative agent
in the decentralized economy and the social planner are well-behaved, in the sense that i)
we obtain interior solutions, and ii) if the transversality condition holds, then the neces-
sary optimality conditions are also su¢ cient. The dynamic evolution of (c; l; k; ) in the
decentralized economy is governed by
_k = Bkl1    c; (27)
c     = 0; (28)
  (1 + ) l +  (1  )B (k=l) = 0; (29)
_ =  
h
B (k=l) (1 ) + (c=k)  
i
; (30)
the initial condition k (0) = k0, and the transversality condition limt!1 e tk = 0.3 The
corresponding system for the socially planned economy is obtained by replacing (30) with
_ =  
h
B(k=l) (1 )   
i
: (31)
3Under (25) the MRS of status z for consumption c, uz=uc, equals  (c=z). In a symmetric equilibrium
this expression simplies to c and, moreover, the partial derivative of relative wealth with respect to own
wealth is given by za = k 1. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium the MRS of own wealth a for consumption
c is given by  (c=k) :
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Observe that under the preference specication (25), the system of equations for the
socially planned economy does not depend on the status parameter . Both the system
that governs the dynamic evolution of the socially planned economy and its solutions are
simply obtained by setting  = 0 in the corresponding equations of the decentralized
economy.4 Consequently, the steady-state values ~, ~l, ~c, and ~k that are given in appendix
5.1 must be interpreted as follows: ~xp = ~xj=0 and ~xd = ~xj>0. Using these solutions, the
signs of the long-run multipliers with respect to the status parameter  are determined
as follows: @~=@ > 0, @~c=@ > 0, @~k=@ > 0, sgn(@~l=@) = sgn(1  ). From these
results it is obvious that the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio, consumption,
and physical capital depend positively on the status parameter . Hence, compared to
the socially planned economy, not only is the capital-labor ratio too high, ~d > ~p, but
agents also consume too much, ~cd > ~cp, and accumulate an excessivestock of capital in
the decentralized economy, ~kd > ~kp. Moreover, the marginal product of labor and, hence,
the real wage exceed their socially optimal counterparts, ~F dl > ~F
p
l , while the opposite
result holds for the rental rate of capital, ~F dk < ~F
p
k = . Note, however, that @
~l=@ may be
of either sign. If  < 1, then agents work too much in the long run, ~ld > ~lp. On the other
hand, if  > 1, then the steady-state value of work e¤ort is less than its socially optimal
counterpart, ~ld < ~lp. The question arises why agents are worse o¤ in the decentralized
economy when, in addition to ~cd > ~cp, it is the case that ~ld < ~lp if  > 1. In other words,
are agents, in fact, worse o¤ compared to the social optimum if they consume more and
enjoy more leisure in the long run? The answer is that intertemporal utility does not only
depend on the long-run values of consumption and work e¤ort, but is also a function of
the transitional dynamics of these variables. The excessive capital accumulation requires
that there is a time interval with excessive saving. Under the specic preferences given by
(25), excessive saving, in turn, is achieved by both under-consumption and excessive work
e¤ort.
Next, we will study the stability properties of the steady state and the transitional
4This property does not hold in general. For instance, if the utility function is of the of Harbaugh (1996)
type,
u = (1  ) 1

c1 z
1 
  1

  l1+;  > 0;  > 0;  > 0; 0 <  < 1;
then both the decentralized and the socially optimal solution depend on . It is not possible to obtain the
socially optimal solution simply by setting  = 0 [for details see Hof (2004)].
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dynamics. Note the following analysis applies to both the decentralized economy and the
socially planned one. From (27)(30) three alternative representations of the nonlinear
di¤erential equation system can be derived: _k = _k (k; x) and _x = _x (k; x), where x = c,
l, . In order to obtain the system of di¤erential equations _k = _k (k; c) and _c = _c (k; c)
[resp. _k = _k (k; l) and _l = _l (k; l)], on which the control-state-space analysis is based,
equations (28) and (29) are rst solved for l and  as functions of k and c [resp. for c
and  as functions of k and l] and then the resulting expressions are substituted into
the di¤erential equations (27) and (30). Alternatively, if the analysis is carried out in the
state-costate space, two di¤erential equations of the form _k = _k (k; ) and _ = _ (k; )
are obtained by rst solving the necessary optimality conditions (28) and (29) for c and
l as functions of k and . In this paper will focus our attention on the control-state-space
analysis, since we can directly see the time paths of consumption and employment in the
corresponding phase diagrams. Linearization around the steady states (~k; ~x), x = , c, l,
yields 0@ _k
_x
1A =Mx
0@ k   ~k
x  ~x
1A ; Mx 
0BBBB@
@ _k
@k

~k; ~x
 @ _k
@x

~k; ~x

@ _x
@k

~k; ~x
 @ _x
@x

~k; ~x

1CCCCA ;
where Mx, x = , c, l, is the corresponding Jacobian. Its elements are denoted by mxij ,
i; j = 1; 2; x = , c, l. While the mxij depend on whether x represents , c, or l, the traces
and the determinants ofM,Mc andMl are identical (Mc andMl are given in appendix
5.2.1 and 5.3.3). The common characteristic equation is given by
0 = P ()  2   ( + ) 
(+ ) 
   (1  ) ( + ) 
2
 (+ ) (+ )
: (32)
Observe that the common determinant of the Jacobians, given by last term in (32), is
negative, so that the roots of the characteristic equation are of opposite sign, i.e., 1 < 0
and 2 > 0. Since this holds for   0, in both the decentralized and the socially planned
economies, the steady states exhibit saddlepoint stability. Before turning to a detailed
analysis of the economys transitional dynamics, we summarize our results thus far.
Proposition 1 If status is determined by relative wealth, then
A) contrary to the relative consumption approach, any steady-state value of the capital-
labor ratio and the consumption-labor ratio in the decentralized economy exceeds its
socially optimal counterpart, i.e., ~kd=~ld > ~kp=~lp and ~cd=~ld > ~cp=~lp,
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B) as in the relative consumption framework, individuals in the long run consume too
much and accumulate an excessive stock of capital, i.e., ~cd > ~cp and ~kd > ~kp,
C) contrary to the relative consumption approach in which individuals always work too
much in the long run, the steady-state level of work e¤ort can be less than or equal
to its socially optimal counterpart,
D) there are specications of preferences and technology that result in unique steady
states in both the decentralized economy and the socially planned one that have the
desirable saddlepoint property.
The proof of this proposition follows from the analysis given above.
3.2.1 Consumption Dynamics
We now turn to the analysis of the transitional dynamics. First, we investigate the behavior
of consumption, using the phase diagram in the (k; c) plane depicted in Figure 1. Solving
the necessary optimality conditions (28) and (29) for l and  we obtain:
l =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+
k

+ c 

+ ;  = c : (33)
Note that l depends positively on capital k and negatively on consumption c. The latter
e¤ect means that for a given level of k, leisure and consumption always move in the same
direction as c changes. Substitution of (33) into (27) and (30) then yields the following
system:
_k =

1  
 (1 + )
 1 
+
B
1+
+ k
(1+)
+ c 
(1 )
+   c; (34)
_c =
c

"


1  
 (1 + )
 1 
+
B
1+
+ k 
(1 )
+ c 
(1 )
+ + (c=k)  
#
: (35)
The resulting _k = 0 isocline, depicted in Figure 1,
cj _k=0 =
 
1  
 (1 + )
1 
B1+k(1+)
! 1
++(1 )
;
is positively sloped, strictly concave, and independent of the status parameter . To the
right of _k = 0, production exceeds consumption so that _k > 0 holds. Note that this rise
in production is due not only to the rise in capital k, but also to the implied increase in
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employment l [see (33)]. Similarly, to the left of _k = 0 production falls short of consumption
so that _k < 0.
As an aid to intuition, it is convenient to write the Euler equation for consumption
(35) as
_c =  1c [re (k; c; )  ] ; where re (k; c; )  Fk ( (k; c) ; 1) + (c=k)
denotes the e¤ective rate of return, which consists of the market rate of return Fk and the
rate of return due to relative wealth preferences  (c=k), such that the capital-labor ratio
, using (33), is expressed as a function of k and c:
 (k; c)  k
l (k; c)
=

(1  )B
 (1 + )
  1
+
k

+ c

+ :
It is clear that k > 0 and c > 0: if k rises by 1 percent, then l (k; c) rises by less than
1 percent, which, in turn, implies that the capital-labor ratio depends positively on k. A
rise in optimal consumption is accompanied by a rise in leisure, i.e., a decrease in work
e¤ort. Therefore, the capital-labor ratio depends positively on c.
For c > 0, the _c = 0 isocline is implicitly determined by the equality of the e¤ective rate
of return and the subjective discount rate, re (k; c; ) = . In the case  = 0, which also
corresponds to the socially planned economy, this condition simplies to Fk ( (k; c) ; 1) =
; implying that the capital-labor ratio  (k; c) is constant along _c = 0. From k > 0 and
c > 0, it is clear that any rise in c must be o¤set by a decrease in k, i.e., the _c = 0 isocline
is negatively sloped and strictly convex, as illustrated in Figure 1. These properties, due
solely to the fact that work e¤ort is endogenous, are in contrast to those of the textbook
Ramsey model with exogenous labor supply in which _c = 0 is a vertical line in the (k; c)
plane.
In the decentralized economy in which  > 0, the properties of the _c = 0 isocline are
more complex. Note rst that the partial derivative of the e¤ective rate of return with
respect to capital is negative, rek < 0, The reason is that a rise in k: i) causes the market
rate of return Fk to decrease due to the implied rise in the capital-labor ratio  (k; c), and
ii) leads to a fall in the status-dependent component of re given by  (c=k). In contrast, the
partial derivative with respect to consumption, rec , may be of either sign. On the one hand,
a rise in c decreases Fk by raising the capital-labor ratio  (k; c), while, on the other hand,
it leads to an increase in  (c=k). These properties of rek and r
e
c mean that the condition
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_c = 0 determines implicitly k as a function of c and . From rek < 0 and r
e
 > 0, it is
also evident that a rise in the status parameter  causes the _c = 0 isocline, as shown in
Figure 1, to shift to the right. Regardless of the value of , it follows from rek < 0 that
to the right of the _c = 0 isocline the e¤ective rate of return is less than the subjective
discount rate, re < . Therefore, according to the Euler relationship, agents then choose a
declining path of consumption, _c < 0. Similarly, to the left of the _c = 0 isocline re > , so
that _c > 0. Comparing the steady states at points P and D in Figure 1, which correspond,
respectively, to the socially planned,  = 0, and decentralized economies,  > 0, it is
clear that agents in the decentralized equilibrium consume too much in the long run and
accumulate too much capital.5 This conrms result B) of proposition 1.
Now let us turn to a detailed analysis of the economys transitional dynamics. Employ-
ing both the initial condition k (0) = k0 and the transversality condition, one can obtain
the following general representation of the stable saddle paths in the (k; x) plane, where
x = c, l:
x (t)  ~x = m
x
11   1
 mx12

k (t)  ~k

=
 mx21
mx22   1

k (t)  ~k

; (36)
where the dynamic evolution of k is governed by
k (t) = ~k + (k0   ~k)e1t: (37)
The last equality in (36) makes use of the fact that the characteristic equation 0 = P ()
can be written as 0 = (mx11   ) (mx22   ) mx12mx21. Since mc11 > 0, mc12 < 0, and 1 < 0,
where the expressions for mc11 and m
c
12 are given in appendix 5.2.1, it follows from (36)
that the stable arm in the (k; c) plane is positively sloped, as depicted in Figure 1. In
other words, capital and consumption always move in the same direction. Observe that
this qualitative result holds for both the decentralized economy in which preferences are
of the relative wealth type for  > 0 and for the socially planned economy, the solutions
of which are obtained by setting  = 0. While  does not a¤ect the sign of the slope of
a stable saddle path, variations in the value of  lead to shifts of the stable arm and can
also cause the magnitude of its slope to change. A special focus of our analysis is how
the initial values of consumption c (0) and work e¤ort l (0) depend on . Using the rst
5Using the results for mc21 and m
c
22 given in appendix 5.2.1, it can be shown that the _c = 0 locus
for  > 0 is negatively sloped at the point of intersection D with the _k = 0 locus if and only if  <
 (1  )  (+ ) 1.
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equality in (36), setting t = 0 and di¤erentiating with respect to  we obtain:
@x (0)
@
=
"
@~x
@
  m
x
11   1
 mx12
@~k
@
#
+

k0   ~k
 @ [(mx11   1) = ( mx12)]
@
: (38)
An analogous result is obtained by employing the second equality in (36). The term in
square brackets, the shift e¤ect, describes the reaction of x (0) resulting from a parallel
shift of the stable arm, which is due to the changes in the steady-state values ~x and ~k.
The other term, slope e¤ect, captures the reaction of x (0) that is due to the change in the
magnitude of the stable arms slope. Note that the slope depends also on the negative root
1, which determines the speed of convergence to the long-run equilibrium. In appendix
5.2.2 it is shown that
@ j1j =@ < 0 (39)
for all admissible parameter values. In other words, an increase in the status parameter 
slows downthe speed of convergence along stable saddle path. There, it is also shown
analytically by evaluating (38) for x = c that a rise in  causes the stable arm in the (k; c)
plane to i) shift downwards, and ii) to become atter.6 The shift e¤ect leads to a decline
in initial consumption c (0). If k0 < ~k obtains, an assumption that we maintain for the rest
of the paper, then the slope e¤ect causes c (0) to increase. Nevertheless, if k0 is su¢ ciently
close to ~k, the negative shift e¤ect will dominate the positive slope e¤ect so that c (0) falls.
In other words, initial consumption in the decentralized economy with status preferences
is too smallcompared to its socially optimal value, i.e., c (0)j>0 < c (0)j=0.
3.2.2 Employment Dynamics
We now consider the behavior of work e¤ort, using the phase diagram analysis in the (k; l)
plane. Solving the necessary optimality conditions (28) and (29) for c and  we obtain:
c =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k

 l 
+
 ;  =
 (1 + )
(1  )Bk
 l+: (40)
Substituting the expression for c into (27) yields
_k = Bkl1   

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k

 l 
+
 : (41)
6Observe that while the phase diagram depicted in Figure 1 o¤ers a graphical proof for this downward
shift of the stable arm, the change in its slope can only be determined analytically.
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With respect to the _k = 0 isocline, which is given by
lj _k=0 =

(1  )B1 
 (1 + )
 1
++(1 )
k
(1 )
++(1 ) ;
we distinguish between the following three cases: i) if  = 1, then it is a horizontal line
in the (k; l) plane; ii) if  < 1, then it is positively sloped and strictly concave; and iii) if
 > 1, then it is negatively sloped and strictly convex.
From (41) it is clear that @ _k=@l > 0, which, in turn, implies that _k > 0 above the
_k = 0 isocline. The economic interpretation of @ _k=@l > 0 is straightforward. An increase
in l causes production to rise and is accompanied by a decrease in optimal consumption
[see (40)]. Similarly, below the _k = 0 isocline _k < 0 holds.
In order to obtain the di¤erential equation for work e¤ort, we rst di¤erentiate the
solution for  given in (40) with respect to time t, and then substitute the resulting
expression for _ as well as the solutions for c and  into (30):
_l=l =
1
+ 
(

 
_k
k
!
 
"
B

k
l
 (1 )
+ 

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k
 
 l 
+

#
+ 
)
: (42)
This di¤erential equation can interpreted as follows: in appendix 5.3.1 we show that if
the utility function u (c; l; z) takes the general additively separable form U (c; z) + V (l),
then the necessary optimality conditions (10) and (11) can be solved for c and  in the
form c = c^ (w; l; a=A) and  = ^ (w; l). Moreover, the corresponding Euler equation for
the agents labor supply becomes
_l=l =
V 0
lV 00

_w
w
 

r +
UzA
 1
Uc

+ 

; (43)
where the partial derivatives of U are evaluated at (c; z) = (c^ (w; l; a=A) ; a=A). It is clear
from the Euler equation that agents choose a rising path of work e¤ort when the sum
of the growth rate of wages and the subjective discount rate exceeds the e¤ective rate
of return. This representation corresponds to the idea of intertemporal substitution of
leisure, where, in contrast to the standard model, the market rate of return r is replaced
by the e¤ective rate of return re. Under our specic parameterization (25), the expression
V 0= (lV 00), which gives the intertemporal elasticity of the agents labor supply, simplies
to  1.
In a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium a = A = K = k, r = Fk (k; l) and
w = Fl (k; l) hold. Using these relationships, the previous expression for the Euler equa-
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tion for individual labor supply yields the following di¤erential equation for equilibrium
employment (details are found in appendix 5.3.2):
_l=l =

lV 00
V 0
  lFll
Fl
 1 "kFlk
Fl
 
_k
k
!
 

Fk +
Uzk
 1
Uc

+ 
#
; (44)
where the partial derivatives of U are evaluated at (c; z) = (c^ (Fl (k; l) ; l; 1) ; 1). Under the
parameterized version of the model, (lV 00=V 0  lFll=Fl) = + and kFlk=Fl =  holds, so
that (44) simplies to (42). In this equation the _k=k term can be interpreted as follows:
since the marginal product of labor Fl (k; l) is homogeneous of degree zero, a rise in the
growth of capital _k=k results in a one-for-one increase in the growth rate of labor demand
for a given growth rate of wages. In equilibrium, the growth rate of employment rises by
less than one-for-one, since a rise in the growth rate of wages generating an increase in
the growth rate of labor supply is required to maintain equilibrium in the labor market
over time.7
In order to obtain a di¤erential equation for equilibrium employment in the form
_l = _l (k; l), we must substitute for _k=k by using (41). This yields
_l=l =
1
+ 
"
  (+ )

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k
 
 l 
+
 + 
#
: (45)
With respect to the _l = 0 isocline given by
lj _l=0 =

+ 

 
+

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+
k
 
+
for l > 0, we can distinguish three cases: i) if  = , then it is a horizontal line in the (k; l)
plane; ii) if  > , then it is negatively sloped and strictly convex; and iii) if  < , then
it is positively sloped and strictly concave.
Observe that in all three cases a rise in  causes the _l = 0 isocline to shift upwards.
Because @( _l=l)=@l > 0, equilibrium employment is rising, _l > 0, above the _l = 0 isocline.
More specically, an increase in employment has the following e¤ects. First, it impacts the
e¤ective rate of return re which, according to the agents Euler equation for work e¤ort
(43), changes the growth rate of labor supply. Observe that the reaction of re to a rise in l
is ambiguous, because, on the one hand, the market rate of return r = Fk increases, while,
on the other hand, the status-dependent component, which equals c (k; l) k 1, declines.
7More specically, a rise in _w=w by one percentage point causes the growth rate of labor supply to rise
by  1 percentage points and the growth rate of labor demand to fall by  1 percentage points.
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The rst e¤ect will tend to reduce the growth rate of labor supply, while the second e¤ect
will work in the opposite direction. There is an additional e¤ect that guarantees a positive
relationship between the growth rate of equilibrium employment, _l=l, and l, as is evident
from (45). Since @ _k=@l > 0 holds due to (41), the rise in l also causes the rate of capital
accumulation _k=k to increase, which, as discussed above in detail in the context of (44),
leads to a rise in the growth rates of both equilibrium employment and the real wage.
Now we are in a position to consider the transitional dynamics in the (k; l) plane.
In doing so we combine analytical results with the intuition gained from phase diagram
analysis. Using the fact that sgn
 
ml21

=  sgn(  ), ml22 > 0 (see appendix 5.3.3) and
1 < 0, it follows from (36) that the sign of the slope of the stable arm in the (k; l) space
equals the sign of the di¤erence   . Hence, if  < , then work e¤ort rises (i.e., leisure
declines) along with capital and consumption, while the opposite is the case if  > , a
result that holds in both the socially planned and the decentralized economies.
Using (38) for x = l, it can be shown that a rise in  causes the stable arm in the
(k; l) plane i) to shift upwards, and ii) to become atter. Observe that both results hold,
irrespective of whether the stable arm is positively ( < ) or negatively ( > ) sloped.
Hence, the unambiguously positive shift e¤ect on l (0) is either reinforced by a positive
slope e¤ect if  < , or dampened by a negative slope e¤ect if  >  (see appendix 5.3.4).
In our subsequent graphical analysis (see Figures 2a and 2b), we will restrict our
attention to two special cases. Figure 2a illustrates the case  =  in which the stable
arm is horizontal and coincides with the _l = 0 isocline. As discussed above, a rise in
the status parameter  causes the _l = 0 line to shift upwards. These properties imply
that employment is constant over time in both the decentralized and the socially planned
economy and that agents work too much at any time t due to status preference. Taking
into account that the _k = 0 isocline is positively sloped because of  =  < 1, Figure 2a
conrms that agents also accumulate too much physical capital (see Proposition 1B).
Figure 2b depicts the other special case  = 1 in which the _k = 0 isocline is horizontal.
Since  <  = 1, both the _l = 0 locus and the stable arm are negatively sloped. A rise in
 results in an upward shift of the _l = 0 isocline. Since, however, _k = 0 is at, this does
not a¤ect the steady-state value of employment. As indicated above, there is positive shift
e¤ect on l (0) resulting from the upward shift of the stable arm, and a negative slope e¤ect
because the downward-sloping stable arm becomes atter, i.e., its slope in absolute value
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declines. Nevertheless, as long as k0 is su¢ ciently close to ~k, the net e¤ect of an increase
in the status parameter  on initial work e¤ort is always positive. Hence, while the level of
work e¤ort in the decentralized economy is socially optimal in the long run, agents work
too hard in the short run.
Extending the phase diagram analysis to the remaining cases, which correspond to
 < ,  <  < 1, and  > 1, we can obtain the following general result: as long as  < 1,
the decentralized economy is characterized by excessive work e¤ort in both the short run
and the long run, compared to the socially planned economy. If, however,  > 1, then
agents work too hard in the short run, but too little in the long run. The latter result, for
example, can be conrmed by taking into account that for  > 1 both isoclines and the
stable arm are negatively sloped and that the _l = 0 isocline intersects the _k = 0 isocline
from above and shifts upwards for an increase in .
Above we have studied the stable arms in the (k; c) and the (k; l) plane. Before we
leave this part of the paper, we briey summarize the co-movements of the consumption-
capital ratio c=k and the capital-labor ratio k=l, respectively, with physical capital k. This
will prove very useful in studying the dynamics of the e¤ective rate of return re and the
optimal tax rate. Similar to employment, the behavior of the consumption-capital ratio
c=k depends on the sign of the di¤erence    . If  < , then c=k and k always move
in the same direction, while the opposite is the case if  > . In the special case  = ,
c=k remains constant as k evolves. In contrast, there is no ambiguity with respect to the
co-movements of the capital-labor ratio k=l and physical capital k. These variables always
move in the same direction, regardless of whether  < ,  = , or  >  holds.8
3.2.3 Numerical Simulation of Transitional Dynamics
Our phase diagram analysis investigated the co-movements of physical capital and, re-
spectively, consumption and work e¤ort. It also revealed how the steady states and initial
values for the control variables in the decentralized economies di¤er from their socially
optimal counterparts. In order to complete the picture of transitional dynamics we plot
the time paths of employment and consumption, respectively, in Figures 3ab and 4. To do
8 If the analysis is carried out in the (k; ) plane, where   c=k, then the corresponding Jacobian M
exhibits the property that sgn(m21) =  sgn(  ) and m22 > 0. Analogously, the Jacobian M, where
  k=l, corresponding to the phase diagram in the (k; ) plane is characterized by the fact that m11 > 0
and m12 < 0 (for complete details see appendix 5.4 and 5.5). Our statements then follow from (36).
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so, we use the decentralized and socially optimal solutions given by (36) and (37) and cal-
culate the implied time paths of employment and consumption under the assumption that
the initial capital stock is the same in both economies and equal to 50% of the socially op-
timal steady-state value. In all gures the following parameter values for the instantaneous
preferences (25) and the Cobb-Douglas production function (26) are assigned:
 = 0:36;  = 0:04;  = 1; B = 1;  = 0:5;  = 0:04:
The capital share  is 36%, the value of the rate of time preference  is 4%, while  = 0:5
implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for individual labor supply of 2:0. For
simplicity, we assign values of unity to the technology and preference parameters  and B.
Regarding the status preference parameter , we choose a value of 0:04. From the preceding
analysis it became clear that the preference parameter  corresponding to the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is crucial in determining
the short and long-run behavior of employment. For this reason, we rst examine the
intertemporal time paths of employment before considering those of consumption.
Regarding the dynamics of employment, we restrict our attention to the case in which
 takes the following two values,  = (0:25; 2:0), and which are illustrated, respectively, in
Figures 3ab.9 We consider these cases, because they provide additional information that
cannot be readily obtained from our previous analysis of the (k; l) phase diagram. Note
that in these graphical illustrations the solidcurve represents the path of decentralized
employment, while the dashed curve corresponds to its socially optimal counterpart,
which is calculated letting  = 0:0 in the decentralized solutions. For example, for the case
illustrated in Figure 3a where  = 0:25 <  = 0:36, we observe that work e¤ort is rising
whether or not the economy is in a private or socially optimal equilibrium. Moreover,
in Figure 3a the path of employment in the decentralized economy always lies above
the corresponding optimal path. In other words, the paths of decentralized and socially
optimal work e¤ort do not intersect if  = 0:25. This reects the non-optimality of the
decentralized solution and the fact that agents work too hardnot only in the short run,
but also in long-run equilibrium if  < 1. Considering next the case, depicted in Figure
3b, in which  = 2:0, we observe that steady-state private work e¤ort is less than that
chosen by the social planner and employment is declining over time. Nevertheless, as we
9The value of  equal to 2:0 is closer to values estimated by empirical research, since it implies a
intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 0:5.
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have shown above, private employment at t = 0 exceeds its socially optimal level. This,
in turn, means that there must be a time t = t in Figure 3b for which the decentralized
and socially optimal paths of employment cross, i.e., a point in time in which the two
paths intersect.10
Finally, we turn to the transitional dynamics of consumption, which is illustrated for
the case  = 0:25 in Figure 4. We depict only this single case, since we can show that the
behavior of consumption over time is qualitatively the same whether or not  is greater or
less than unity. Consistent with our above results, we observe in Figure 4 that decentralized
initial consumption c(0) falls short of the initial value that would obtain in the socially
optimal economy. Again, private agents consume too little at t = 0 compared to the
social optimum. As, however, we have indicated above, this is a necessary counterpart
of the fact that status-conscious agents accumulate too much physical capital during
the transition to steady state. Because, eventually, the latter ensures over-consumption
regardless of the long-run behavior of employment, this means that there exists a time
t = t for which the decentralized and socially optimal paths of consumption cross,
so that subsequent to t = t private agents begin to over-consume. One aspect that
does, however, depend on the value of  is the timing of the intersection of the paths of
decentralized and socially optimal consumption. In particular, we can show that the point
of intersection occurs earlier in the adjustment phase as  becomes larger.
3.3 Optimal Taxation: A Note
As indicated above, the ine¢ ciencies in the relative wealth approach result from the fact
that the e¤ective rate of return on wealth accumulation exceeds the socially optimal rate,
given by the marginal product of physical capital, i.e., re  Fk + (uz=uc) k 1 > Fk. In the
following we will show that this distortion caused by relative wealth preferences can be
completely removed by taxing capital income appropriately. If the government imposes a
tax on capital income and returns lump-sum transfers, then the ow budget constraint of
the representative household equals
_a = (1  ) ra+ wl   c+ q;
10This crossing-pattern occurs only if  > 1. For case (not illustrated) in which  <  < 1 decentralized
employment is declining and always greater than employment in the socially optimal economy.
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where  and q denote, respectively, the tax rate on capital income and lump-sum transfers.
We assume that each individual not only takes the time path of A, but also the evolution
of  and q as given. As before, we will restrict attention to symmetric macroeconomic
equilibria, so that a = A, and make the added assumption that the government contin-
uously runs a balanced budget, i.e., ra = rk = q. The following proposition regarding
the optimal taxation of capital income can then be obtained for our general specication
of preferences.
Proposition 2 If the government sets the tax rate  on capital income according to the
rule
 = (C;L;K)  uz (C;L; 1)K
 1
uc (C;L; 1)Fk (K;L)
; (46)
where C, K, and L denote the average values of consumption, capital and hours worked,
and rebates total tax revenues as lump-sum transfers, then the social optimum is attained
in the decentralized economy with relative wealth preferences.
We wish to stress the following two aspects. First, since the optimal tax rate is a
function of average values,  = (C;L;K), each agent takes its time path, similar to
those of the interest rate r and the real wage w, as given. Second, because applying the
optimal tax rule ensures that xd (t) = xp (t) for t  0, where x denotes any variable of the
model, the time path of the optimal tax rate satises  (t) =  (cp (t) ; lp (t) ; kp (t)).
The idea of the proof of (46), the details of which are provided in appendix 5.6.1,
is straightforward: the goal of the welfare-maximizing government is to impose a tax
rule  = (C;L;K) guaranteeing that in the symmetric equilibrium of the decentralized
economy the after-tax e¤ective rate of return reproduces the socially optimal rate, so
that
[1   (c; l; k)]Fk (k=l; 1) + uz (c; l; 1) k
 1
uc (c; l; 1)
= Fk (k=l; 1) (47)
holds for all c, l, and k.
To gain additional insights regarding the behavior of the optimal tax, we employ the
parameterized version of model, based on the illustration (25). Recall that the status-
related component of the e¤ective rate of return re equals [uz (c; l; 1) =uc (c; l; 1)] k 1 =
 (c=k). The goal of optimal tax policy is to remove the resulting distortion so that
xd (t) = xp (t) for t  0, which requires, according to (47), that the time path of the
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optimal tax rate satises the following condition:
Fk (k
p=lp; 1) =  (cp=kp) : (48)
Observe that the time path of the optimal tax rate depends on how the before-tax market
rate of return and the status-related component evolve along the socially optimal time
paths of the capital-labor ratio and the consumption-capital ratio. As we showed above,
the capital-labor ratio   k=l moves in the same direction over time as physical capital,
regardless of whether  = 0 or  > 0. This, in turn, implies that if k0 < ~k, then the before-
tax market rate of return along the socially optimal path, Fk (p; 1), declines over time as
p rises. In contrast, for   0 the co-movements of the consumptioncapital ratio (c=k)
and physical capital k, as indicated at the end of subsubsection 3.2.2, are ambiguous and
depend on the sign of the di¤erence  . Consider, rst, the special case  = . Here, the
consumption-capital ratio and, thus, the status-dependent component evaluated along
the socially optimal path, (cp=kp) is not changing over time. Consequently, the optimal
tax  rises as Fk (p; 1) falls to maintain (48) and exactly o¤set the constant distortion
represented by (cp=kp). If  < , then the ratio (cp=kp) does not remain constant, but
increases as kp increases. It is obvious, then, that the optimal  must increase over time to
ensure the condition (48) and o¤set the rising relative wealth distortion. Even if  > 
the case in which the ratio (cp=kp) falls over time as kp rises we can show analytically
that  must also rise, which is attributable to the fact that Fk (p; 1) declines more rapidly
than  (cp=kp).
In order to convey the idea of the proof, we substitute Fk (k; l) = B (k=l)
 (1 ) into
(48) and solve for  :
 =
 (cp=kp)
Fk (kp=lp; 1)
=

B
cp (kp)  (lp) (1 ) =


cp
yp
; (49)
where yp = B (kp) (lp)1 . First, note that the optimal tax rate converges to ~  =
in the long run, because, due to the simplifying assumptions made in our model, steady-
state consumption equals steady-state output, ~c = ~y.11 Linearizing (49) around the steady
state, we derive in the appendix 5.6.2 the following expression that governs the dynamic
11Observe that ~ is independent of  1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption.
Further, the numerical parameterization used above yields a value of 11% for the steady-state optimal tax.
Note that tripling the status parameter  to a (feasible) value of 0:12 yields a ~ of 33%, which is close to
real-world values.
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evolution of the optimal tax rate:
 (t) =


+
 p1


kp (t)  ~kp

; kp (t)  ~kp =

k0   ~kp

e
p
1t;
where p1 = 1j=0 and  is a positive constant. Since p1 < 0 and  > 0, the optimal tax
rate and physical capital always move in the same direction in our parameterized model.
Furthermore, according to ~  =, there exists a one-to-one relationship between the
optimal tax rate  and the status parameter  in the long-run. From (48), Fk (kp=lp; 1) =
 (cp=kp), and the fact that the time paths of xp are independent of  in our model, it
follows that this relationship holds for all t  0.
Using our numerical model, it is straightforward to depict the rising adjustment paths
of  , although we do not illustrate them here. Letting  = (0:25; 2:0), we can show that
the optimal tax at t = 0 is lower for  = 0:25 than it is for  = 2:0. This reects the
fact that a smaller value of , i.e., a greater willingness to substitute consumption over
time, leads to a lower initial level of consumption, cp(0), which, in turn, implies that the
status-dependent component of the e¤ective rate of return,  (cp=kp), is less important
and, consequently, requires a smaller initial optimal tax.
4 Conclusion
We examine in this paper the e¤ects of the quest for status within a Ramsey-type model in
which labor supply is endogenously determined and agents are homogeneous. Although in
our general model we allow the agents status to be determined either by her relative con-
sumption or her relative wealth, our analysis focuses on the latter case. In general, status
preferences lead to ine¢ cient outcomes due to externalities. In the relative consumption
framework the willingness to substitute consumption for leisure is too high, while in the
relative wealth approach the e¤ective rate of return that consists of the market interest
rate and a status-related component exceeds the socially optimal level.
Our analysis divides into two parts: a general treatment in which we consider the long-
run implications of status preferences and a specic illustration that permits us to study
the saddle path dynamics of the control variables consumption and work e¤ort in the
relative wealth framework. Under both specications of the quest for status, the steady
state possesses the property that consumption and the stock of physical capital are greater
than their socially optimal counterparts. While in the relative consumption approach the
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steady state is always characterized by excessive work e¤ort, there are specications of
relative wealth preferences in which agents work too little in the long run. In the latter case
agents, nevertheless, can a¤ordexcessive consumption, since, in contrast to the relative
consumption approach, the capital-labor ratio and the output per hours worked exceed
their socially optimal levels. Moreover, although agents in this case consume both more
leisure and more goods in the long run than in the socially planned economy, they are worse
o¤ as measured by intertemporal utility. This is due to the fact that the excessive capital
accumulation is achieved by under-consumption and excessive work e¤ort in the initial
phase of the planning horizon. While the results for the steady state hold for quite general
specications of relative wealth preferences, a detailed analysis of transitional dynamics
requires the introduction of simplifying assumptions on the utility function. In the phase
diagram analysis and the numerical simulations we specify that work e¤ort is additively
separable from own consumption and status. Along the stable arm, consumption always
moves in the same direction as physical capital. In contrast, the co-movement of work
e¤ort with physical capital is ambiguous: if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
of consumption is less than the inverse of the capital share, then work e¤ort decreases
as physical capital increases. In the opposite case in which the willingness to substitute
consumption over time is relatively high, the results are reversed. These qualitative results
with respect to transitional dynamics hold for both the decentralized economy and the
socially planned one.
In the decentralized economy there is both under-consumption and excessive work ef-
fort in the initial phase of transitional dynamics, where this deviation from the socially
optimal solution is amplied by a rise in the degree of status consciousness. In the empir-
ically plausible case in which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption
is less than unity, agents work too little in the long run. Hence, the time paths of decen-
tralized and socially optimal work e¤ort intersect, i.e., there is too much work e¤ort in
the short run and too little in the long run. In contrast to employment, the time paths
of decentralized and socially optimal consumption intersect for all admissible parameter
values, i.e., there is always under-consumption in the short run and excessive consumption
in the long run. In addition, we demonstrate that an increase in the status parameter
slows downthe economys speed of convergence along stable saddle path.
Finally, we show that the social optimum can be replicated in the decentralized econ-
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omy by optimally taxing capital income, where the optimal tax rate depends positively on
the degree of status consciousness and increases as physical capital accumulates. Optimal
taxation ensures that the after-tax e¤ective rate of return reproduces the one in the
socially optimal economy.
5 Appendix
5.1 The steady-state values
The steady-state values of c, l, k, and  are given by
~c =
0@ (1  )
 (1 + )
B
1+
1 

+ 

(1+)
1 
1A 1+ ; (50)
~l =
0@ (1  )
 (1 + )
B
1 
1 

+ 

(1 )
1 
1A 1+ ; (51)
~k =
0@ (1  )
 (1 + )
B
1+
1 

+ 

++(1 )
1 
1A 1+ ; (52)
~ =

(+ )B

 1
1 
: (53)
5.2 Control-State Space Analysis in the (k; c) plane
5.2.1 The Jacobi matrix Mc
In order to derive a system of di¤erential equations in k and c, the necessary optimality
conditions (28) and (29) are rst solved for l and  in the following form:
l =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+
k

+ c 

+ ;  = c :
Substitution of these results into (27) and (30) then yields the following di¤erential equa-
tions:
_k =

1  
 (1 + )
 1 
+
B
1+
+ k
(1+)
+ c 
(1 )
+   c;
_c =
c

"


1  
 (1 + )
 1 
+
B
1+
+ k 
(1 )
+ c 
(1 )
+ + (c=k)  
#
:
The steady-state values ~k and ~c, which are determined by setting _k = 0 and _c = 0, are
given by (52) and (50). Di¤erentiating _k (k; c) and _c (k; c) with respect to k and c and
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evaluating the resulting expressions at

~k; ~c

yields the Jacobi matrix Mc. Its elements
are given by
mc11 =
 (1 + ) 
(+ ) (+ )
; mc12 =  
 (1  ) + + 
+ 
;
mc21 =  
2
 (+ )2

 (1  )
+ 
+ 

; mc22 =  

(+ ) 

 (1  ) 
+ 
  

:
5.2.2 Shift and Slope e¤ects of changes in  in the (k; c) plane
First, we will show that @1=@ > 0, and thus @ j1j =@ < 0 holds for all  > 0. Implicit
di¤erentiation of the characteristic equation (32) yields
@1
@
=
 [(1  ) ( + )    (1  ) (+ ) 1]
(+ ) (+ ) [( + )   2 (+ ) 1]
: (54)
Note that  < 1 is su¢ cient for @1=@ > 0, which, in turn, implies that @ j1j =@ < 0.
In case that  > 1 we have
@1
@
> 0()   (1  ) ( + ) 
(   1) (+ ) < 1 () P

  (1  ) ( + ) 
(+ ) (   1)

> 0;
where the second equivalence is easily veried by using a graphical representation of the
strictly convex characteristic polynomial and taking into account that P (1) = 0 and
P () > 0 for  < 1: Since
P

  (1  ) ( + ) 
(+ ) (   1)

=
(1  ) [(   1) + (1  )] ( + ) [( + ) +  (1  )] (+ ) 2
2 (+ ) (+ )2 (   1)2 > 0;
we obtain that @1=@ > 0, and thus @ j1j =@ < 0 holds for all  > 0. 
Second, we evaluate (38) for the case in which x = c and obtain
@~c
@
  m
c
11   1
 mc12
@~k
@
=
(+ ) 1
(1  ) (+ ) ( + )
~k < 0;
@ [(mc11   1) = ( mc12)]
@
=   + 
 (1  ) + + 

 (1 + )
(+ )2 (+ )
+
@1
@

< 0:
Because 1 < 0, the rst result implies that a rise in  causes the stable arm in the (k; c)
plane to shift downwards. Taking into account that @1=@ > 0 holds, as demonstrated
above, the second result shows that the stable saddle path becomes atter as  increases.
30
5.3 Control-State Space Analysis in the (k; l) plane
5.3.1 The Euler Equation for Individual Labor Supply (43)
If the utility function u (c; l; z) takes the general additively separable form U (c; z)+V (l),
then the necessary optimality conditions (10)(11) and the di¤erential equation for the
costate variable (12) can be written as follows:
Uc (c; a=A)   = 0; (55)
V 0 (l) + w = 0; (56)
_= =  

r +
Uz (c; a=A)A
 1
Uc (c; a=A)
  

: (57)
Equations (55) and (56) can can be solved for c and  in the following form:
c = c^ (w; l; a=A) ;  = ^ (w; l)   V 0 (l) =w:
Di¤erentiating  = ^ (w; l) with respect to time t and and dividing the resulting expression
by  we obtain
_

=
lV 00 (l)
V 0 (l)
_l
l
  _w
w
: (58)
Substituting (58) into (57) and rearranging yields
_l
l
=
V 0 (l)
lV 00 (l)

_w
w
 

r +
Uz (c^ (w; l; a=A) ; a=A)A
 1
Uc (c^ (w; l; a=A) ; a=A)

+ 

; (59)
which is equivalent to (43). 
5.3.2 The Euler Equation for Equilibrium Employment (44)
Due to the assumption of perfect foresight each agent knows that the equilibrium levels of
the rental rate of capital and the real wage satisfy r = Fk (K;L) and w = Fl (K;L), where
K and L denote the average physical capital and average hours worked in the economy.
Observe that since each agent takes the time paths of K and L as given, she also takes
the time path of r and w as given. From w = Fl (K;L) it then follows that
_w
w
=
KFlk (K;L)
Fl (K;L)
_K
K
+
LFll (K;L)
Fl (K;L)
_L
L
: (60)
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Substitution of r = Fk (K;L) and (60) into (59) shows that the agents Euler equation for
labor supply can be rewritten as
_l
l
=
V 0 (l)
lV 00 (l)
(
KFlk (K;L)
Fl (K;L)
_K
K
+
LFll (K;L)
Fl (K;L)
_L
L
 

Fk (K;L) +
Uz (c^ (Fl (K;L) ; l; a=A) ; a=A)A
 1
Uc (c^ (Fl (K;L) ; l; a=A) ; a=A)

+ 

:
In a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium l = L and a = A = K = k holds. Substituting
these relations into the agents Euler equation and rearranging we obtain the following
Euler equation for equilibrium employment:
_l
l
=

lV 00 (l)
V 0 (l)
  lFll (k; l)
Fl (k; l)
 1(kFlk (k; l)
Fl (k; l)
_k
k
 

Fk (k; l) +
Uz (c^ (Fl (k; l) ; l; 1) ; 1) k
 1
Uc (c^ (Fl (k; l) ; l; 1) ; 1)

+ 

:
This representation is equivalent to (44). 
5.3.3 The Jacobi matrix Ml
In order to derive a system of di¤erential equations in k and l, the necessary optimality
conditions (28) and (29) can be solved for c and  in the following form:
c =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k

 l 
+
 ;  =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
k l+:
The latter equation implies that _= =  

_k=k

+ (+ )

_l=l

. Substitution of these
results into (27) and (30) yields the following system of di¤erential equations:
_k = Bkl1   

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k

 l 
+
 ;
_l =   l
+ 
"
(+ )

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k
 
 l 
+
   
#
:
Linearization about the steady state yields the Jacobi matrix Ml. Its elements are given
by
ml11 =  
 (1  )
 (+ )
; ml12 =

1  + + 


B
1
1 

+ 

 
1 
;
ml21 =  
(  ) (+ )
(+ ) 
B 
1
1 

+ 

  2 
1 
; ml22 =


:
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5.3.4 Shift and slope e¤ect of changes in  in the (k; l) plane
Evaluating (38) for x = l we nd that
@~l
@
  m
l
11   1
 ml12
@~k
@
=   1
~k
(1  ) (+ ) ( + )B
  1
1 

+ 

  
1 
> 0;
@
  ml21 =  ml22   1
@
= ml21
[( + )   (+ )  (1 + ) 1]
(1  ) (+ )  ( 1)
 
ml22   1
2 @1@ :
Using the fact that 1 < 0, @1=@ > 0 and the ndings given in appendix 5.3.3,
sgn
 
ml21

=  sgn(  ), and ml22 > 0, it is clear that
sgn
 
@
  ml21 =  ml22   1
@
!
= sgn

ml21

=  sgn
  ml21
ml22   1

=  sgn (  ) :
Hence, a rise in  causes the stable arm in the (k; l) plane i) to shift upwards, and ii) to
become atter, i.e., the absolute value of its slope falls. Observe that both results hold,
irrespective of whether the stable arm is positively ( < ) or negatively ( > ) sloped.
5.4 Control-State Space Analysis in the (k; c=k) plane
In the additional appendix (not intended for publication) we demonstrate that the dynamic
evolution of k and   c=k is governed by the following system of di¤erential equations:
_k = B

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1 
+
k
(1+) (1 )
+  
(1 )
+   k; (61)
_ =


"
(  )B

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1 
+
k 
(1 )(+)
+  
(1 )
+ + ( + )    
#
: (62)
The steady-state values ~k and ~ are determined by setting _k = 0 and _ = 0. It is easily
veried that the solution for ~k equals (52), while ~ =  (+ ) 1. Di¤erentiating _k (k; )
and _ (k; ) with respect to k and  and evaluating the resulting expressions at

~k; ~

in
order to obtain the elements of the Jacobian M we can show that
m11 =  
(1  )  ( + )
(+ ) (+ )
;
m12 =  
+  + (1  ) 
+ 
B
+
(+)(1 )

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+

+ 

++(1 )
(1 )(+)
;
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m21 =  
(  ) (1  ) ( + )
 (+ )

(1  )B
 (1 + )
  1
+

B  +(1 )(+)

+ 

  (++(1 ))+(1 )(+)+(+)(1 )
(+)(1 )
;
m22 =

(1  ) 2 +   + 2  + (+ ) 
 (+ ) (+ )
> 0:
From sgn[ m21= (m22   1)] =sgn(  ), it then follows that the sign of the slope of the
stable arm in the (k; c=k) plane equals the sign of (  ).
5.5 Control-State Space Analysis in the (k; k=l) plane
In the additional appendix (not for publication) we show that the dynamic evolution of k
and  = k=l is governed by the following system of di¤erential equations:
_k = Bk (1 )  

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k 

 
+
 ; (63)
_ =

+ 
"
(+ )B (1 ) + (   )

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k 
+
 
+
   
#
: (64)
The steady-state values ~k and ~ are given by (52) and (53). Di¤erentiating _k (k; ) and
_ (k; ) with respect to k and  and evaluating the resulting expression at the steady state
(~k; ~) in order to calculate the elements of the of the Jacobian M we can show that
m11 =
( + ) 
(+ ) 
> 0;
m12 =  
(+ ) + (1  ) 

B
 
(1 )(+)

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+

+ 

  (1 )
(1 )(+)
< 0:
Hence, the slope of the stable arm in the (k; k=l) plane, which, according to (36), is
expressed as (m11   1) = ( m12), is unambiguously positive.
5.6 Optimal Taxation
5.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
If the government imposes a tax on capital income and runs a balanced budget for all t
by returning lump-sum transfers, then the costate equation (14) is replaced by
_ =  

(1  )Fk (k; l) + uz (c; l; 1) k
 1
uc (c; l; 1)
  

; (65)
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while all other equations that determine the decentralized solution remain unchanged and
coincide with their socially optimal counterparts. Since the representative individual takes
the time paths of C, L, and K as given, she also takes the time path of the tax rate
 = (C;L;K) as given. In a symmetric equilibrium in which identical individuals make
identical choices,  = (c; l; k) holds. According to (46) we have
 = (c; l; k) =
uz (c; l; 1) k
 1
uc (c; l; 1)Fk (k; l)
:
Substitution of this result into (65) yields _ =   [Fk (k; l)  ], which coincides with
the di¤erential equation (8) that governs the dynamic evolution of the shadow value 
in the socially planned economy. Hence, the tax policy given in Proposition 2 implies
that the dynamic evolution of the variables in the decentralized economy and the socially
planned economy are governed by identical sets of equations and conditions. Therefore,
the decentralized economy under the tax rule (46) replicates the socially planned one.
5.6.2 The optimal tax rate
First, the optimal tax rate given (49) can be rewritten as
 =

B
p (p)1  ;
where  = c=k and  = k=l. Linearization around the steady state (~p; ~p) yields
 = ~ +

B
(~p)1  (p   ~p) + (1  ) 
B
(~p) (~p)  (p   ~p) : (66)
The steady-state values ~ , ~p and ~p are obtained by using (50), (52) and (53) and setting
 = 0:
~ = =; ~p = =; ~p = (B=)
1
1  : (67)
From (36) it follows that
p   ~p = m
;p
11   p1
 m;p12

kp (t)  ~kp

; p   ~p = m
;p
11   p1
 m;p12

kp (t)  ~kp

; (68)
where p1 = 1j=0 and mx;pij = mxij

=0
. Substituting (67) and (68) into (66) and using the
expressions form;pij andm
;p
ij given in subsections 5.4 and 5.5 to calculatem
x;p
ij = m
x
ij

=0
,
we can show that the expression for the optimal tax rate simplies to
 (t) =


+
 p1


kp (t)  ~kp

;
where
 =




B
+
(1 )(+)

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+



 (1+)
(1 )(+)
> 0:
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6 Additional Appendix (not for publication)
6.1 Control-State Space Analysis in the (k; c=k) plane the derivation
of (61) and (62)
In order to derive a system of di¤erential equations in k and c=k we rst introduce the
denition   c=k. Substitution of c = k into (27)(30) yields the following system:
_k = Bkl1    k; (69)
 k     = 0; (70)
  (1 + ) l +  (1  )B (k=l) = 0; (71)
_= =  
h
B (k=l) (1 ) +    
i
: (72)
Solving the necessary optimality conditions (70) and (71) for l and  as functions of k and
, we obtain
l =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
+
k
 
+  

+ ; (73)
 =  k : (74)
Di¤erentiating  =  k  with respect to time t we obtain
_= =   ( _=)  

_k=k

: (75)
Substitution of (73) into (69) yields the di¤erential equation
_k = B

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1 
+
k
(1+) (1 )
+  
(1 )
+   k: (76)
that equals the di¤erential equation (61).
Substituting (73) and (75) into (72) yields
_ =


"
B

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1 
+
k 
(1 )(+)
+  
(1 )
+ +      
_k
k
#
: (77)
Using (76) to calculate _k=k and substituting the resulting expression into (77), we nally
obtain the di¤erential equation (62):
_ =


"
(  )B

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1 
+
k 
(1 )(+)
+  
(1 )
+ + ( + )    
#
:
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6.2 Control-State Space Analysis in the (k; k=l) plane the derivation of
(63) and (64)
Letting  = k=l, substitution of l = k= into (27)(30) yields the following system:
_k = Bk (1 )   c; (78)
c     = 0; (79)
  (1 + ) (k=) +  (1  )B = 0; (80)
_= =  
h
B (1 ) + (c=k)  
i
: (81)
Solving the necessary optimality conditions (79) and (80) for c and  as functions of k and
 we obtain:
c =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k 

 
+
 ; (82)
 =

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1
k (+): (83)
Substitution of (82) into (78) yields
_k = Bk (1 )  

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k 

 
+
 : (84)
that equals the di¤erential equation (63).
Di¤erentiating (83) with respect to time t we obtain
_= = 

_k=k

  (+ ) ( _=) : (85)
Substitution of (82) and (85) into (81) yields
_

=
1
+ 
"
B (1 ) + 

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k 
+
 
+
 + 
_k
k
  
#
: (86)
Using (84) to calculate _k=k and substituting the resulting expression into (86), we nally
obtain the di¤erential equation (64).
_ =

+ 
"
(+ )B (1 ) + (   )

(1  )B
 (1 + )
 1

k 
+
 
+
   
#
:
37
References
[1] Abel, A. B., 2005, Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark
Levels of Consumption, Review of Economic Studies, 72(1), 2142.
[2] Boskin, M. J. and E. Sheshinski, 1978, Optimal Redistributive Taxation when Indi-
vidual Welfare Depends on Relative Income, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 92,
589601.
[3] Corneo, C. and O. Jeanne, 1997, On Relative Wealth E¤ects and the Optimality of
Growth, Economics Letters 54 (1), pp. 8792.
[4] Corneo, G. and O. Jeanne, 2001a, On Relative Wealth E¤ects and Long-Run Growth,
Research in Economics 55, 349358.
[5] Corneo, G., and O. Jeanne, 2001b, Status, the Distribution of Wealth, and Growth,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103(2), 283293.
[6] Dupor, B. and W.F. Liu, 2003, Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption, American
Economic Review 93(1), 423428.
[7] Fisher, W. H., 2004, Status Preference, Wealth, and Dynamics in the Open Economy,
German Economic Review 5(3), 335355.
[8] Fisher, W. H. and F. X. Hof, 2000a, Relative Consumption, Economic Growth, and
Taxation, Journal of Economics 72, 24162.
[9] Fisher, W. H. and F. X. Hof, 2000b, Relative Consumption and Endogenous Labor
Supply in the Ramsey Model: Do Status Conscious People Work Too Much?, Eco-
nomics Series of the Institute for Advanced Studies No. 85, Vienna.
[10] Fisher, W. H. and F. X. Hof, 2005, Status Seeking in the Small Open Economy,
Journal of Macroeconomics 27(2), 209232.
[11] Frank, R.H., 1985, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods,
The American Economic Review, March, 101116.
[12] Futagami, Koichi, and Akihisa Shibata, 1998, Keeping one step ahead of the Joneses:
status, the distribution of wealth, and long run growth, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization (36) 1, pp. 93111.
38
[13] Gali, J., 1994, Keeping Up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio
Choice, and Asset Prices, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 26, no. 1,
February, 18.
[14] Grossmann, V., 1998, Are Status Concerns Harmful for Growth?, FinanzArchiv 55
(3), 35773.
[15] Harbaugh, R., 1996, Falling behind the Joneses: relative consumption and the growth-
savings paradox, Economics Letters 53, 297304.
[16] Hof, F.X., 2004, Does the Quest for Status Give Rise to Excessive Work E¤ort and
Excessive Consumption? Relative Consumption Versus Relative Wealth, Vienna
University of Technology, mimeo.
[17] Hof, F.X. and F. Wirl, 2003,Wealth Induced Multiple Equilibria in Small Open Econ-
omy Versions of the Ramsey Model, Vienna University of Technology, mimeo.
[18] Liu, W.F. and S.J. Turnovsky, 2005, Consumption Externalities, Production External-
ities, and the Accumulation of Capital, Journal of Public Economics 89, 1097 1129.
[19] Ljungqvist, L. and H. Uhlig, 2000, Tax Policy and Aggregate Demand Management
Under Catching Up with the Joneses, The American Economic Review 90, 35666.
[20] Persson, M., 1995, Why are Taxes so High in Egalitarian Societies? , Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 97(4), 569580.
[21] Rauscher, M., 1997, Conspicuous Consumption, Economic Growth, and Taxation,
Journal of Economics, Vol. 66, No. 1, 3542.
[22] Turnovsky, S.J., 1995, Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics, The MIT Press.
[23] Van Long, N. and K. Shimomura, 2004a, Relative Wealth, Status-Seeking, and
Catching-Up, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53, 529542.
[24] Van Long, N. and K. Shimomura, 2004b, Relative Wealth, Catching-up, and Economic
Growth, in S. Dowrick, R. Pitchford, and S.J. Turnovsky, eds., Economic Growth and
Macroeconomic Dynamics: Recent Developments in Economic Theory, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1845.
39
Figure 1: Phase Diagram in (k, c) 
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Figure 2a: Phase Diagram in (k, l), α=θ<1 
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Figure 2b: Phase Diagram in (k, l), α<θ=1 
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Figure 3a:  The Paths of Decentralized and Planner’s Employment for 0.25θ =  
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Figure 3b:  The Paths of Decentralized and Planner’s Employment for 0.2=θ  
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Figure 4:  The Paths of Decentralized and Planner’s Consumption for 0.25θ =  
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